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A. Introduction
Mental health issues are garnering more attention by the media and society in recent
years. Society stigmatizes those with mental health problems, viewing them as being sick,
incompetent, or crazy, undermining both the person’s abilities and freedom of choice1. This
stigma is pervasive. It is found in every aspect of our culture, from the media to the justice
system. Congress recognized and attempted to combat this stigma when they enacted the
Americans with Disabilities Act2 (ADA), giving rights back to a group of people that have often
felt powerless and frustrated with the lack of compassion and understanding they experience in
their everyday lives. While this legislation has been beneficial, it has not eradicated the stigma
for those that battle mental health issues.
This paper will explore the result of that stigma by addressing the Third Circuit’s
decision to allow forcible medication of civilly committed mental health patients in nonemergency situations, the relevant case law on the subject, and demonstrate how this decision is
a violation of Title II of the ADA3 and the US Constitution4. Specifically, three cases are
relevant to the topic. First, Washington v. Harper5 was a landmark case heard by the Supreme
Court, which held that inmates do not have a right to refuse medication as long as there is a
process in place that allows the inmate to voice his or her concerns. Next, Hargrave v. Vermont6
was decided by the Second Circuit Court, which held that a civilly committed patient who
wished to refuse medication could execute a Durable Power of Attorney (DPOA) and assign the
power to make decisions regarding medication to a principal, and those decisions can only be
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overruled in a court of law. Finally, the Third Circuit decided Disability Rights v. NJ7, holding
that patients who have been discharged and are awaiting a new placement can refuse treatment,
but those still in custody of a state psychiatric hospital do not have the same right. The rules
handed down from these cases create a situation that makes it difficult for people with mental
disabilities to refuse medication when they are committed to a state hospital. However, two
different sources of law could bring relief for these patients. First, Title II of the ADA8 prohibits
states and local governments from discriminating against those with disabilities. This regulation
allows those with mental disabilities to file a lawsuit against state-owned psychiatric hospitals if
they believe they have suffered from discrimination, such as forcible medication9. Second, the
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution protects citizens from a variety of harms10. Both
of these arguments are explored in more detail below. Finally, this paper will discuss remedies
and demonstrate how they are reasonable modifications of the existing programs.

B. History of Disparate Treatment
This section will explore the cases that are relevant to this topic to give background
information on the history of this issue in the courts. In particular, this section will discuss a case
decided by the Supreme Court and cases decided in the Second and Third Circuits. These cases
showcase differing opinions regarding the treatment of mental health patients in state run
psychiatric hospitals.
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1. Washington v. Harper11
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of forced medication for civilly
committed patients12. However, they have decided a case that involved forced medication of
criminally committed patients. There, the Court decided this was permissible under the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution13.
In Washington v. Harper14, Harper was convicted of robbery and served time in the
prison’s mental health unit after being diagnosed with a mental disorder15. For a time, he
consented to treatment by antipsychotic drugs, but when he first refused treatment, his physician
sought to forcibly medicate him16. In order to do this, the physician had to follow the rules set
out in SOC Policy 600.30, which states that a physician who wishes to forcibly medicate a
patient must present his reasons before a special committee; if the committee approves the
treatment, then the inmate must submit17. The inmate has certain rights, such as the right to
attend the meeting, present evidence, receive notice of the diagnosis, to receive assistance during
the hearing, and to appeal the decision. Finally, forced medication can only occur for a specific
period of time, and after that time has lapsed, the process must start over if the inmate continues
to refuse treatment18. In Harper’s case, the special committee found that forcible medication was
appropriate, as he was considered a danger to himself or others as a consequence of his mental
disorder. As a result of this decision, Harper was forcibly medicated for one year19. Harper filed
a lawsuit, arguing that the hearing before the special committee did not satisfy the Due Process
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Clause, and sought both damages and injunctive relief20. The Court recognized that Harper had a
great interest in whether or not he received treatment via antipsychotic medication, but decided
that the hearing before the special committee satisfies the Due Process Clause, since an inmate is
only forcibly medicated if he or she is a danger to himself, herself, or others. The Supreme
Court held that it is in the inmate’s best interest to be forcibly medicated in this type of situation,
and the process outlined in SOC Policy 600.30 comports with the Due Process Clause under
these circumstances21.
While the majority agreed with this decision, there was a compelling dissent authored by
Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall22. The dissenters stated that forcible medication is
degrading and a gross violation of the inmate’s liberty23. They elaborated that the right to choose
whether or not to be treated by antipsychotic medication is a fundamental right that deserves the
highest level of protection, and that test was not met in this case, concluding that SOC Policy
600.30 violates the Due Process Clause and is unconstitutional24.
While this case is not concerned with a mental health patient that is civilly committed, it
does shed some light on various perceptions of people who have mental illnesses. Here, the
majority decided that if the person is a danger to himself or others, that person’s right to choose
how to be treated is disregarded. On the other hand, the dissent argued that a person’s right to
choose should almost never be taken from them25. This case also centers around a person who
was deemed to be a danger to himself or others, which is a different situation than the cases
heard by the Second or Third Circuits, and could be the reason why the Supreme Court believed
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they were justified in upholding SOC Policy 600.30. However, the question as to whether this
same type of policy should be upheld for those who are civilly committed and not deemed to be
dangerous remains undecided by the Supreme Court.

2. Hargrave v. Vermont26
In 2003, the Second Circuit addressed the question posed above. Vermont enacted a
statute that allows civilly committed mental health patients to execute a durable power of
attorney (DPOA) and authorize a person, also known as a principal, to make decisions for them,
including whether or not forcible medication is appropriate27. If the principal refuses
pharmacological treatment on behalf of the patient, the statute allows mental health professionals
to petition a probate court to override their decision. The court then allows the principal’s
decision to stand for 45 days, after which the patient’s condition will be reviewed. If the
patient’s condition has not improved, the court may decide that forcible medication is
appropriate and disregard the principal’s request, even in non-emergency situations28.
Nancy Hargrave suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and was civilly committed multiple
times, where she was forcibly medicated but did not exercise her right to execute a DPOA29.
After being forcibly medicated in a non-emergency situation, she executed a DPOA and filed a
lawsuit against the state of Vermont, alleging that the statute violated Title II of the ADA and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act30. She argued that the statute was discriminatory based on
her disability, while the state argued that Hargrave fell into the “direct threat” exception outlined
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in the ADA, meaning that those who pose a direct threat to themselves or others are not provided
protection under the ADA31.
The court did not agree that all mental health patients that are civilly committed pose a
direct threat, as the state did not prove that all patients pose a threat to others, per the definition
of “direct threat” under the ADA. Also, the court held that the state did not determine whether
the patient posed a direct threat to others at the time they overrode the principal’s request, which
can be a significant period of time after commitment, and the patient’s behavior and
circumstances may have changed significantly since then32. This determination is a crucial
requirement when overriding the principal’s request; otherwise, execution of a DPOA has little
merit and offers little protection to the patient.
The court then analyzed whether the Vermont statute discriminated on the basis of
disability. The court reasoned that the statute enacted a process where only mentally ill patients
who are subject to forcible medication and execute DPOAs must appeal to a family court if their
preferences are overridden, where other individuals who are physically disabled may appeal their
principal’s overridden requests in probate court. The difference between the two circumstances
means the statute treats mentally ill patients differently than it treats other types of patients, and
that is discriminatory per the ADA33.
Vermont then argued that changing the process by which abrogation of the principal
occurs would fundamentally alter the program, and the ADA protects programs by prohibiting
changes that would be a fundamental alteration34. However, the court reasoned that the program
is not what would be altered, but rather the way in which the principal’s requests are overridden,
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which would only be a minor change and is allowable by the ADA. Therefore, the defendants
lost the case and the court found for the plaintiff35.
This case focused on the topic of this paper—forcible medication of civilly committed
mental health patients in non-emergency situations. The outcome is telling, because the plaintiff
won on the argument that her rights were violated per the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
unlike the plaintiff in Washington v. Harper, who argued and lost on the argument that his
constitutional rights of procedural due process were violated36. It appears, based on these two
cases, that claiming a person suffered discrimination prohibited by the ADA is more persuasive
than arguing that a person is not adequately protected by procedures. That conclusion is
reinforced by a case heard by the Third Circuit this past year.

3. Disability Rights N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs37
This case is the main focus of this paper. The plaintiff’s argument appears to be clumsy,
and the Third Circuit responds accordingly. Here, the facts are somewhat similar to Hargrave v.
Vermont38, but the court narrowly distinguishes the two cases instead of creating a circuit split39.
The facts and analysis are discussed below.
The state of New Jersey operates four psychiatric hospitals for civilly committed
patients40. There are two different types of patients at the hospitals—those that are civilly
committed and CEPP patients, or Condition Extension Pending Placement. These patients no
longer need the hospital’s services and are waiting on an appropriate alternative placement, but
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may not be moved immediately because of a lack of availability, so they can carry their CEPP
status for some time. Both types of patients are subject to two different policies for forcible
medication—AB 5:04A, which addresses forcible medication in emergencies, and AB 5:04B,
which addresses forcible medication in non-emergency situations41. As this paper focuses on
forcible medications in non-emergency situations, AB 5:04B is the only policy that will be
discussed.
AB 5:04B states that a mental health patient can be forcibly medicated if he or she has
been involuntarily committed, has been diagnosed with a mental illness, and poses a risk of harm
to self, others, or property if the medication is not administered42. The risk of harm is defined as
suicidal threats or attempts, severe self-neglect, behavior that places others in reasonable belief
that they will be harmed, or behavior that has resulted in substantial damage to property. If a
patient meets this test, then they may be forcibly medicated once the review process has been
completed43.
The review process is similar to judicial review44. First, the treating physician must file
an involuntary medication administration report, which gives the reasons why the patient should
be forcibly medicated. Next, a panel is assembled of hospital employees who may treat patients
but are not involved in that particular patient’s treatment, and that panel then conducts a hearing
to decide if the doctor’s recommendation of forcible medication should be honored45. The
patient can attend the hearing and present evidence on his or her behalf, and can request a mental
health professional, legal counsel, or a client services advocate to attend, all who would assist the
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patient through this hearing. If the chair of the panel and one other member vote that the
substantive standard is satisfied, meaning that they believe that the patient is mentally ill and
poses a risk of harm to self, others, or property, the patient can be forcibly medicated. This
decision is valid for 14 days, after which a panel may then authorize forcible medication for 90
days. If the patient still does not consent to medication at the end of this time period, the hospital
must start the process over again if they wish to continue forcible medication46. This policy
applies to all patients, including those labeled as CEPP47, an issue the Third Circuit deals with in
this case.
Disability Rights, the plaintiff, made two arguments, the first being that AB 5:04B was a
violation of the patient’s due process rights. Specifically, they argued that the process outlined
above does not satisfy their due process rights because it is not a judicial process48. They
brought this claim under Title II of the ADA, which posits that state entities may not
discriminate against disabled persons by excluding them from a “service[], program[], or
activit[y]”49. The plaintiffs argued that the judicial process is the service they are being excluded
from, instead of the right to refuse medication50. The court appeared confused by this argument,
believing Disability Rights to be mistaken and even asked the plaintiffs to clarify what exactly
they were arguing. The Third Circuit noted that Disability Rights had at one time argued that the
“service[], program[], or activit[y]” being denied was the right to refuse forcible medication;
however, the plaintiffs reiterated that their argument was confined to the judicial process, or
procedural aspect, instead of a right to refuse medication as a violation of the ADA51. Therefore,
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the court confined its analysis to a procedural argument and thus a procedural remedy, and did
not consider whether the right to refuse medication could be considered a “service[], program[],
or activit[y]” protected by the ADA52.
The Third Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs must lose, because the right to a judicial
process is not guaranteed to nondisabled people, and interpreted Title II of the ADA as only
extending the rights traditionally given to nondisabled people to those who are disabled53.
Specifically, all New Jersey citizens are entitled to a judicial process when they are being
committed; however, after that point, there is no such protected right. The only protected rights
that civilly committed patients have in New Jersey are those contained in AB 5:04. The Third
Circuit reasoned that the ADA does not guarantee that disabled people receive the same
procedural treatment when being cared for or treated as those who are not disabled54. However,
New Jersey law does protect the rights of other patients, such as hospital patients, to refuse
medication and treatment. This differs from the argument the plaintiffs made, which is
specifically focused on the lack of judicial processes, and not the right of refusal55.
The Third Circuit then addressed Hargrave v. Vermont56, which the plaintiffs relied upon
when presenting their argument57. The Third Circuit distinguished the case before them from
Hargrave, stating that the plaintiffs in Hargrave successfully identified a service, program, or
activity that was being excluded from those that were civilly committed and refusing treatment—
the right to execute a DPOA only to have the principal’s decisions overridden in family court.
Disability Rights failed to identify a similar program, activity, or service, and as such the court
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reasoned that there was not a circuit split. The court reiterated that Hargrave further proves their
point—Title II only protects a disabled person from being denied a benefit from a public entity
that has been given to nondisabled people58. Therefore, the Third Circuit held that both CEPP
and non-CEPP patients lost the Title II claim59.
Disability Rights also argued that the process outlined in AB 5:04B violated the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution60. The Third Circuit
addressed this claim differently for CEPP and non-CEPP patients61. The court used Harper62 to
determine that non-CEPP patients’ constitutional rights had not been violated, as the Supreme
Court upheld a policy almost identical to that laid out in AB 5:04B63.
The Third Circuit then turned their analysis to CEPP patients, who are different from
non-CEPP patients, as they have already been deemed to no longer need or qualify for
involuntary confinement and are remaining in custody until they are transferred to a different
facility64. The court stated that Harper65 did not address this situation, so it cannot control the
analysis66, and instead, turned to another case, Matthews v. Eldridge67, which used a balancing
test that is more appropriate to this situation. After applying that test, the court held that AB
5:04B cannot apply to CEPP patients68. If a patient is truly in need of psychotropic drugs and is
refusing, New Jersey should recommit the patient, removing them from CEPP status, before
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doing so. Otherwise, the person’s constitutional rights are violated. Therefore, CEPP patients
are entitled to a judicial process before being forcibly medicated, per their constitutional rights69.
In summary, the Third Circuit did not address the issue of the right to refuse forcible
medication as a right protected under Title II of the ADA or the Constitution70. Instead, the issue
addressed is whether civilly committed patients who refuse forcible medication are entitled to a
judicial process. The court held that the process outlined in AB 5:04B does not violate Title II of
the ADA, but does violate the Constitution for CEPP patients71.

C. Analysis of Disability Rights N.J. Inc. v. Comm’r N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs
There is some indication in the Third Circuit’s opinion that if the plaintiffs had claimed
that the right of refusal, instead of the judicial process, was the service, program, or activity
being excluded from civilly committed patients, the court would have used a different analysis
and the case may have had a different outcome. The court made it very clear that this was not
what was being argued before them, and asked Disability Rights to clarify their argument before
undergoing any type of analysis72. It can be implied, then, that their holding can only be applied
to the specific argument presented by Disability Rights, and the question of whether the right of
refusal is a viable argument is still open.
The court first asked the plaintiffs to clarify their argument because they referred to both
the right of refusal and the judicial process as being the activity, program, or service that was
being withheld from civilly committed patients73. After asking for clarification, the plaintiffs
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stated that their argument was limited to the lack of judicial process, and the court discussed at
great length how they were bound by this answer when analyzing the argument74. Given the
court’s great care in ensuring that they did not include the right of refusal in their analysis, and
the great care they took in ensuring that the parties knew that this was not included in their
decision, it begs the question whether the Third Circuit believes that the right of refusal was the
better argument. In other words, it leaves one to wonder what the outcome of the case would
have been if the plaintiffs had answered differently, and stated that the right of refusal was the
activity, service, or program being withheld.
There are a few other indications within the opinion that bolsters this theory. The Third
Circuit alludes to the fact that a right of refusal could be considered an activity, program, or
service under Title II of the ADA. Specifically, they state that the “phrase ‘service, program, or
activity is extremely broad in scope and includes ‘anything a public entity does’”75. The court
then quotes Title II of the ADA, pointing out that the “regulations provide that ‘[a] public entity,
in providing any aid, benefit, or service, may not, directly or through contractual, licensing, or
other arrangements, . . . limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others receiving the aid, benefit, or
service’"76. Finally, the court almost says it outright: “[A]lthough we assume that the right to
refuse medical treatment (or another such right, whether it be common-law or statutory) could be
a service, program, or activity within the meaning of Title II, this is not the service, program, or
activity posited by Disability Rights”77. This can be interpreted as an admission that the right to
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refuse is still a valid claim and should have been argued by the plaintiffs. Unfortunately, the
plaintiffs utilized a different approach, and the court was bound by that argument78.
The Third Circuit appeared open to the argument outlined above, which would have led
to a different outcome and given patients greater protections while under the state’s care. It is
argued in this paper that this is exactly the case, and unless AB 5:04B is revised in some way,
perhaps to be similar to Vermont’s statute that allows the execution of DPOAs, then the mental
health patients that are civilly committed in New Jersey and being forcibly medicated are
suffering from unlawful discrimination. Alternatively, the plaintiffs could have also sought relief
under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution if they had reframed the issue during
their argument. A different outcome would have occurred if the plaintiffs had utilized either
argument.

D. Title II of the ADA
1. History
At this point, it is appropriate to focus on the American with Disabilities Act. The Act is
broad, so Title II will be the main focus, since it is the focus of the dispute in the above case. In
order to fully understand the issue of this paper, the scope and intent of the statute should be
discussed and some examples of the statute protecting individuals with disabilities should be
examined.
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to combat discrimination against people with
disabilities79. It had large support in both houses after a task force presented evidence of
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discrimination against people with disabilities80. In particular, Congress found that “historically,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a
serious and pervasive social problem”81. Congress also reached the conclusion that “physical or
mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's right to fully participate in all aspects of
society”82. In response, Congress enacted the ADA and gave it the power necessary to remedy
the wrongs they discovered. Specifically, the ADA “invoke[s] the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce,
in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities”83.
The ADA has three distinct parts, all regulating different aspects of life in order to
accommodate people with disabilities. Title II is concerned with public services and regulates
both state and local governments84. It specifically states that “no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity”85. Also, the types of mental health issues that would warrant
civil commitment are included in the ADA’s definition of disability86. As a result, the ADA
could provide a remedy for the issue present in Disability Rights N.J., Inc87.
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There is an exception for state governments included in Title II. The regulation states that
the government only needs to make a reasonable modification, and that if the modification would
fundamentally alter the program, service or activity, the state does not have to make the
modification88. Therefore, it is up to the government to prove that any alteration would make a
fundamental difference; if they cannot support this claim, the modification must be made.

2. Title II of the ADA in Court
Several cases have been argued seeking remedies provided by Title II of the ADA, but
none have argued that forcible medication of civilly committed patients in a non-emergency
situation is prohibited89. A variety of other claims have been settled under Title II, though,
demonstrating the ADA’s strength and legislative breadth. In Tennessee v. Lane, the plaintiff
sued the state for a lack of accommodations necessary to access the courthouse90. The case
reached the Supreme Court, which held that the claim was appropriately brought under Title II of
the ADA and that creating an accommodation would not fundamentally alter the courthouse91.
In Olmstead v. L. C. by Zimring, the plaintiffs were mental health patients seeking placement in a
different facility, and they argued that the defendant’s refusal to transfer them was discrimination
under Title II of the ADA92. The defendants raised the reasonable modifications defense, and the
Supreme Court stated that while the defense is valid, the defendants must prove that placing the
plaintiffs in a different treatment program would truly be more than a reasonable modification93.
Finally, in Cal. Council of the Blind v. County of Alameda, the plaintiffs were blind and brought
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an action under Title II of the ADA for a lack of accommodation when voting in elections94. The
court in that case found for the plaintiffs95. Although there are many other cases brought under
Title II of the ADA, these three demonstrate the variety of issues that are covered by the act.
This is consistent with the purpose and scope of the act, as Congress intended for the ADA to
remedy a variety of wrongs suffered by those with disabilities96.
Title II of the ADA gives citizens a private right of action, allowing people who have
physical or mental disabilities to file a lawsuit for discrimination97. Title II specifically prohibits
state and local governments from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities98,
unless a modification would present an undue burden or fundamental alteration of the program,
service or activity that is in dispute99. While this relieves some pressure off the state or local
government, the government still carries the burden of proof when arguing that the modification
would fit the exception. A variety of different claims can be brought under the act, and although
unattempted, arguing that the right to refuse forcible medication in non-emergency situations for
civilly committed mental health patients is a violation of the act.

E. Forcible Medication of Civilly Committed Patients in Non-Emergency Situations is a
Violation of Title II of the ADA
As the Third Circuit indicated, forcible medication of civilly committed patients in nonemergency situations is prohibited by Title II of the ADA100. In order for this claim to proceed,
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the requirements set out by the ADA must be met101, and a reasonable modification must be
possible102. The argument that the plaintiffs in Disability Rights N.J., Inc.103 should have
brought is laid out below.
First, Title II is addressed to state and local governments, so the discrimination must be a
result of the state or local government’s action104. That requirement is satisfied in the case,
because the psychiatric hospitals are operated and funded by the state of New Jersey105. As a
result, this criterion is not an issue. Second, only “qualified individuals” may bring suit106. This
means that only individuals who would need the services provided by the psychiatric hospitals
can file a lawsuit, which also is not an issue in this case. Finally, the remedy must be reasonable,
and any modifications made cannot fundamentally alter the program, service, or activity107. That
will be addressed below, but does not pose a problem in this situation.
Similar to the above cases, Disability Rights could have shown that AB 5:04B is
discriminatory on its face, because it does not allow mentally ill patients the right to refuse
medication in non-emergency situations108. Generally, this is a right conferred upon others that
are not mentally ill. For example, if someone goes to the doctor for a cold and the doctor
prescribes a medicine, the patient is under no obligation to fill the prescription or to take the
medicine. AB 5:04B treats those who are mentally ill differently than those who are not
mentally ill, which is the very definition of discrimination. This type of treatment is born out of
the stigma associated with mental health. It appears that the state of New Jersey believes its
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judgment concerning medication is better than those with mental health issues. However, the
Supreme Court has recognized that mental health patients have a significant interest in whether
or not they are medicated109. The dissent in Washington v. Harper states that “[e]very violation
of a person’s bodily integrity is an invasion of his or her liberty. . . . And when the purpose or
effect of forced drugging is to alter the will and the mind of the subject, it constitutes a
deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense”110. The dissenting justices go on
to say that the ability to refuse forced medication is a basic value of our society, and that those
who are not mentally ill have been granted the right to refuse medication because their
fundamental rights are protected111. This differential treatment is discrimination—protecting the
rights of those that are mentally competent, but overriding the rights of those that are mentally ill
through a procedural process in a psychiatric hospital.
Of course, a right is not the same thing as a “program[], service[] or activit[y]”112. This
might be the source of the difficulty the Third Circuit faced while deciding Disability Rights113.
However, some of the cases brought under Title II of the ADA dealt with rights that had been
denied those with a disability because of a lack of an appropriate program, service or activity.
For example, as discussed above, the plaintiff in Tennessee v. Lane had been denied the right to
vote because he was unable to get to the voting booth as a result of his disability114. Voting is
considered a fundamental right in this country115. In Tennessee, the need for a program, service,
or activity was directly tied to a fundamental right—if the plaintiff was unable to access the
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voting booth, he was essentially being denied a fundamental right116. A similar situation arose in
Cal. Council of the Blind v. County of Alameda when the plaintiffs were also unable to vote as a
result of their disability117. The plaintiffs sued for a different machine that would allow them to
vote, which is considered a program, service, or activity. Again, the accommodation was
directly tied to a fundamental right, and without the accommodation, the fundamental right was
denied. In Disability Rights, the plaintiffs are denied the right to refuse medication in nonemergency situations. The program, service, or activity that could be instituted is not necessarily
an automatic accommodation of that right. In other words, the remedy is not necessarily giving
civilly committed patients the absolute right to refuse medication. The remedy would be
implementing a program, service, or activity that would protect their right to refuse medication
through a hearing process. The procedural hearing process in place right now is inadequate to
protect the fundamental rights of civilly committed patients. This remedy is discussed in more
detail below.
The ADA was designed to prevent such situations from even occurring118, and the facts
presented in this case are a violation of the prohibitions contained in the statute. People suffering
from mental health problems still have a liberty interest in what happens to their body119, and if
they are not deemed dangerous, then they should be considered competent to make their own
decisions. As such, if the plaintiffs in Disability Rights had argued the case in another way, the
results would have been different.
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F. Forcible Medication of Civilly Committed Patients in Non-Emergency Situations is a
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment
1. Substantive Due Process
Another argument the plaintiffs made in Disability Rights is that the plaintiffs’ due
process rights were violated120. The court only analyzed a procedural due process claim, and
held that non-CEPP patients’ due process rights were not violated by the process allowing
forcible medication, but that CEPP patients’ rights were violated, and their due process rights
required a judicial process121. While the procedural due process claim may not have merit for
non-CEPP patients, a substantive due process claim should.
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment has both procedural and substantive components. The procedural component
encompasses the right to a procedural due process, and the Supreme Court has protected that
right on a number of occasions122. The Court has also recognized that the Due Process Clause
contains a substantive component123. The substantive component protects a person’s liberty, as
stated in the clause, and the Court has used these words on a number of occasions to curtail
government action124. The plaintiffs in Disability Rights should have argued that the way AB
5:04B reads is a violation of substantive due process.
The patients in New Jersey’s psychiatric hospitals have a fundamental right to refuse
forcible medication. As discussed above, the dissenting justices in Washington v. Harper
recognized this right, and disagreed with the majority in the outcome of the case, believing that
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the right to say what happens to one’s body is a fundamental liberty interest125. This right is
ground in a number of Supreme Court cases, starting with Griswold v. Connecticut, where the
Court established a right to privacy and bodily autonomy126. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized implied fundamental rights, such as the right to bodily autonomy and integrity, which
are not expressly stated in the Constitution127. With this judicial recognition as a foundation, and
with the Court’s willingness to find implied fundamental rights in a variety of cases, it can be
easily inferred that the right to refuse forcible medication is another such right.
Once it has been established that the right to refuse medication is a fundamental right, the
court should use strict scrutiny to determine whether AB 5:04B violates that right, meaning that
the court will examine the policy extremely closely to determine whether or not it should be
upheld. This is a tier of review that the Supreme Court has previously utilized whenever a
fundamental right has allegedly been violated128. Legislation that inhibits fundamental rights is
allowed as long as there is a compelling state or government interest and the legislation is
narrowly tailored to address the problem129. Here, AB 5:04B fails both prongs of the test—the
government interest is not compelling and the policy is not narrowly tailored. First, the
government interest is not compelling because AB 5:04B only applies in non-emergency
situations, implying that the government simply wishes to medicate the patient because the state
believes that is the best mode of treatment. The patient has not been deemed to be a danger to
him or herself, others, or property. Therefore, the government would need to produce another
reason as to why they are forcibly medicating in these situations. Next, AB 5:04B is not
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narrowly tailored, because it allows forcible medication anytime the hearing committee decides
this is the best course of action. The patient has a chance to be heard during the hearing process,
but if his or her wishes are overridden, then the hearing panel has the final decision. There is no
other alternative built in for the patient to protect his or her choice of treatment. The government
has other available alternatives to ensure that the patient’s treatment wishes are respected while
also effectively treating the patient, such as engaging in other modes of therapy, assigning the
patient a DPOA as in Hargrave130, or allowing the patient to go off of his or her medication and
then allowing the patient to decide what he or she wants in terms of treatment. Policy AB 5:04B
only provides for the hearing process as a remedy for a patient who refuses medication, and the
Supreme Court generally does not allow that sort of broad or all-encompassing solution when a
fundamental right is at stake.
The plaintiffs in Disability Rights argued that their procedural due process rights were
violated by AB 5:04B, and the Third Circuit rejected this argument for non-CEPP patients131.
Procedural due process rights generally only guarantee that a process is in place that allows a
person to voice his or her concerns; therefore, a judicial process is not guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment132. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs did not argue that their
substantive due process rights were violated, which very well may have been a winning
argument. The patients have a liberty interest in resisting medication, which is a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution. As a result, the Third Circuit would need to engage in a
heightened level of review—strict scrutiny—when analyzing whether or not AB 5:04B should be

130

Hargrave, 340 F.3d 27.
Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 304.
132
See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507 (2011).
131

24

upheld. Since the government interest is not compelling and the policy is not narrowly tailored,
it should be struck down.
1. Procedural Due Process
Disability Rights attempted to make a procedural due process argument and failed in
regards to non-CEPP patients133. However, if they reframed their procedural due process
argument, then the case would have had a different outcome. As discussed earlier, the Third
Circuit hinted at such a situation when discussing whether or not the plaintiff’s argument was a
right to refuse medication or the need for a judicial process134. If the plaintiffs had argued that
their procedural due process rights were violated because they were not afforded adequate
protection when refusing medication, the court would have found in favor of the plaintiffs for
both CEPP and non-CEPP patients.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed issues arising out of the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause, giving citizens rights to express their concerns when they
have been deprived of life, liberty, or property135. As both Harper136 and Disability Rights137
have demonstrated, that hearing does not always mean that a judicial process is warranted.
However, the more serious the alleged harm, the more likely the court will be to hold that a
procedural issue exists. The plaintiffs in Disability Rights are deprived of a right that is central
to our societal values—liberty. The plaintiffs have a liberty interest in having their right to
refuse medication in non-emergency situations by a more robust procedural process. The Third
Circuit engaged in the Mathews balancing test when analyzing whether or not CEPP patients’
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procedural due process rights had been violated, but not for non-CEPP patients138. This is a
direct result of how the argument was framed. The plaintiffs argued that a judicial process was
required instead of arguing that a procedural process that better protects the right to refuse
medication is necessary. Since that was the argument, the Third Circuit relied on Harper when
analyzing the claim for non-CEPP patients, because it is binding authority139. Harper did not
apply to CEPP patients, so the Third Circuit relied on the Mathews balancing test140. If the
plaintiffs had argued that the right to refuse was the program, service, or activity that was denied,
the Third Circuit would have found the procedural process outlined in Policy 5:04B inadequate
for both CEPP and non-CEPP patients.
If analyzing the claim that the right to refuse medication is what is being denied patients
at psychiatric hospitals in New Jersey, the Third Circuit would not be able to rely on Harper141,
but instead would have to utilize the Mathews balancing test142. Harper applies when the
argument is that a judicial process is required to protect procedural due process rights; here, it is
argued that a more robust procedure is required, and not necessarily one that is judicial in nature.
The Third Circuit would need to balance the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will
be affected by the official action” (2) "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail."143 After balancing these factors with the facts present in Disability Rights144, the Third
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Circuit would hold that a more robust procedural process must be in place to protect a citizen’s
right to refuse forcible medication in non-emergency situations.
First, the “private interest that will be affected by the official action”145 is substantial.
The dissent in Harper vehemently stated that people have a strong liberty interest in resisting
forcible medication, stating that such a violation of a person’s liberty deserves the highest
protection146. Bodily autonomy and integrity is what is affected by the official action, and it
deserves more protection than what AB 5:04B current gives. Next, "the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards"147 also tips in the plaintiffs’ favor. The risk of
error is great—citizens are forced to endure a treatment that they do not choose, even in nonemergency situations. They must endure the side effects of psychotropic medication, which can
be great148. They also must endure the humiliation of submitting to another person when it
comes to treating their mental illness or disorder. This is amplified when considering the second
prong of this requirement—the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. If the
procedural process that allowed patients to voice their concerns were more robust, then it is
likely that fewer patients would have to be forcibly medicated. Third, "the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail" also sides with the plaintiff149. The
government has an interest in treating patients that are admitted to their psychiatric hospitals.
They also have an interest in keeping these patients safe and helping them function at their
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highest level possible. The government’s interest can be protected with a more robust procedural
process, and the additional expense would be minimal. The process is already in place, as
described in Disability Rights150, so the changes would incur minimal expense. The changes
would ensure that the patients’ concerns were heard and protected, while also taking into account
the government’s wishes in regards to treatment.
The plaintiff’s in Disability Rights attempted to make a procedural due process argument,
but failed in regards to non-CEPP patients151. The claim should have centered around a patient’s
right to refuse medication, and not the lack of a judicial process. If the plaintiff’s had claimed
that their right to refuse medication was unprotected by the existing procedure found in AB
5:04B, the Third Circuit would have found in favor of the plaintiffs after engaging in the
balancing test found in Mathews v. Eldridge152.

E. Remedies and Reasonable Modifications to AB 5:04B
1. Allowing a patient to assign a DPOA
If the plaintiffs had reframed their argument and relied on one of the two authorities
outlined above, then the case would have been decided differently. At that point, the state would
need to decide how to modify the existing program in order to accommodate those who wish to
refuse medication. There are a few alternatives that are available to the government that will not
fundamentally alter the existing process and can ensure that each patient receives the appropriate
treatment153. The fact that there are such alternatives available helps to prove the point made
earlier—that the policy as it stands violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. If
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no alternatives were available, the court could rule that the existing policy is narrowly tailored to
fit the problem. However, AB 5:04B is not narrowly tailored and alternatives are available. The
best modification is the system available in Vermont—allowing patients to assign a person
power of attorney and to allow that person to make decisions for them.
The Second Circuit has already decided that allowing a patient to execute a DPOA is
appropriate from both a medical and a legal standpoint154. Adding this provision to AB 5:04B
allows the state to accomplish their goal of respecting the patient’s autonomy while also ensuring
that they receive the best treatment. By allowing the patient’s voice to be heard when making
decisions regarding treatment, giving them the autonomy and integrity they deserve, and
allowing a person who is of sound mind and body to be the person making decisions and
working with the physicians and psychiatrists when making decisions about treatment, a DPOA
protects the patient and enables the state to continue operating their psychiatric hospitals as
unusual. It is suspected that the state overrides a patient’s wishes because there is little respect
given for the decisions made by those who suffer from mental illness155. Perhaps the state views
the patient to be incompetent, thus believing that the soundness of the patients’ decision to be
compromised. The Third Circuit correctly recognized that they can no longer make decisions of
this nature for CEPP patients, but the judicial system should also respect non-CEPP patients’
refusal to be medicated. Allowing the patient to assign a principal will give the patient that
freedom and allow the state to discuss treatment options with someone who does not suffer from
mental illness.
Additionally, allowing a patient to execute a DPOA is not a fundamental alteration of the
program. The only change would be the assignment of a principal to a patient who refuses to be
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medicated and requests such an accommodation. Then, the state would need to treat the
principal’s decisions in the same way they would treat someone possessing power of attorney for
someone who is not mentally ill. In other words, if the state still wishes to override the
principal’s decision, then that could be done, but only through a process that is not
discriminatory towards those with mental illnesses. The process would need to be the same
process enacted when overriding the power of attorney for someone who is not mentally ill. The
process would also need to satisfy the procedural and substantive components of the Due Process
Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The current solution—allowing a court to override a patient’s medical treatment
preferences—allows a person who is unconnected with the patient to make decisions for them.
Judges have to find a solution that objectively balances their notion of justice with the law’s
theories of individual autonomy and liberty. This is different from a doctor or therapist, who
tends to make treatment decisions based on what he or she subjectively believes is best for the
patient. It is believed that a principal will be more in line with the doctor or the therapist when
making treatment decisions for the patient, creating an acceptable solution for a difficult
situation. It is in the patient’s best interest to have someone who is intimately acquainted with
his or her medical diagnosis and treatment making decisions for him or her, instead of a third
party who must weigh other considerations outside of the patient’s treatment.
Per Title II of the ADA, the state is required to provide “auxiliary services or aids” to
accommodate those with disabilities156. This has been mandated by the judicial system again
and again, as demonstrated in the discussion regarding the cases successfully brought under Title
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II of the ADA157. The option to assign somebody with power of attorney could be another such
“auxiliary service[] or aid[]” to accommodate someone with a mental health disability.

2. Mandating that the patient’s counselor be involved
Changing AB 5:04B to mandate that the patient’s counselor be present at all hearings and
be part of the decision making process is another accommodation that could protect the patient.
The counselor can advocate for the patient and give him or her a voice when the patient would
not otherwise have a way to speak up for him or herself.
As AB 5:04B currently stands, the counselor that works with the mental health patient
can be present at all hearings, but is not required to be, and is not allowed to be on the panel or
committee that makes the decision to forcibly medicate the patient. This is disturbing for a few
reasons. Mental health professionals create a certain type of relationship with their patients.
They see their patients weekly, sometimes daily, and understand their needs in a way that an
impartial panel or committee does not. Also, the way that AB 5:04B is written does not ensure
that the hearing committee is entirely impartial. It is comprised of professionals that are not
involved in that particular patient’s case, but all of the professionals work together at the same
hospital or facility158. The panel members know each other, and some members may be in
positions of authority over others, potentially leading to a conflict of interest during a hearing.
Given this set of facts, it only makes sense that the patient’s counselor be involved in this
process. The counselor can educate the panel or committee on the patient’s mental health history
and why he or she is refusing medication. In other words, the “auxiliary aid or service” provided

157
158

Supra D.2
Disability Rights N.J., Inc., 796 F.3d at 298-299.

31

would be requiring that the counselor be present at such hearings in order to advocate for the
patient.
In addition to those explained above, there are also several alternatives the state could
utilize to change AB 5:04B to be less discriminatory towards mental health patients who refuse
medication. The remedies discussed are just a few that are available, but would help to satisfy
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Title II of the
ADA. Allowing a patient to assign a DPOA has already been approved by the Second Circuit159,
indicating that it is a reasonable remedy that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the
existing program in New Jersey. Mandating that a counselor be present at the hearings has not
been proposed, yet, but it is another component that could be added to AB 5:04B that would
allow the patients to have an advocate that truly understands their needs.

F. Conclusion
People with disabilities have long faced discrimination by both private individuals and
the government160. Those suffering from mental disabilities are no exception, and many are
subjected to a lifetime of treatment and misunderstanding. Forcibly medicating a patient in a
non-emergency situation is not something that has been widely analyzed by courts in this
country; however, some courts have tackled the issue with mixed results161. The courts have to
balance the autonomy of the patient and the interests of the state, which may be tainted by beliefs
that people suffering from mental disorders cannot make sound decisions for themselves. This
can be a difficult balance to strike, but it is possible. The plaintiffs in Disability Rights have
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valid arguments, but they were not presented or addressed in the recent decision handed down by
the Third Circuit162. As it stands, AB 5:04B violates both Title II of the ADA and the Due
Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. If New Jersey allowed civilly committed mental health
patients to execute a DPOA, then both of those violations would be satisfied and the existing
program would not be fundamentally altered.
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